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Abstract: 
 
 When NAFTA was not extended in December 2008, was it demonstrating the 
kind of interdependence, rather than integration, Ernst Haas was proposing for the 
European Community in the 1970s? How does NAFTA compare with the European 
Union today? What theoretical patterns have persisted, and what is new? 
 Addressing those questions, this study (a) applies Haas‟s 3 rationalities 
(disjointed incrementalism, rational analytical, and fragmented issue linkage), 3 
cognitive-perceptual attributes (political objectives, knowledge used, and actor 
learning), and 3 behavioral-institutional attributes (tactical choices, bargaining styles, 
and institutions/mechanisms) to North America; and (b) compares NAFTA experiences 
with the European Union today. 
 Among the findings: (a) Though the institutionally more advanced EU still 
struggles to claim a supranational identity, NAFTA‟s ample institutional experiences 
may be too locked at an inter-governmental junction to proceed to the supranational. (b) 
A more compelling external environment constrains integrative outcomes in both, in 
turn refortifying domestic constraints. (c) Disjointed incrementalism is far more 
extensive and intensive across North America than in West Europe, even though North 
America seems less interested in its regional possibilities. (d) Whereas North American 
dynamics predicting mature interdependence appear more receptive to global 
integration, West European dynamics predicting adequate regional integration is more 
constrained against global integration. (e) Though Haas‟s rationalities and attributes 
explain the 1970s West European turbulence well, they fall increasingly short of 
accounting, not just the subsequent European evolution, but also the “new kid” in the 
regional bloc—North America. 
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Introduction: 
  
 “When the going gets tough,” as one cliché puts it, “the tough gets going!” No 
stranger to scholarly success, Ernst B. Haas became one of the most pre-eminent critics 
of neo-functionalism, the theory he himself had pioneered. Though neo-functionalism 
captured West European integrative dynamics more fully than any other paradigm in the 
1950s, by the 1970s, Haas noted more constraints and almost grounded his theoretical 
propositions. He was far-sighted enough to claim that propositions “do not disappear 
overnight,” becoming obsolete; but that the “gradual process” of obsolescence was still 
underway.1  While other scholars may debate how West European integration has fared 
in the forty-odd years since his reconsiderations, this work is more interested in 
examining the validity of those same constraints in a different setting—across North 
America (where the 1993 free-trade agreement opened up a parallel integrative case for 
comparative analysis) before returning to today‟s West Europe for a brief comparison. 
Haas’s Legacy: A North American Application 
 Three integrative assumptions, Haas had argued, were coming apart across West 
Europe in the 1970s: (a) integrative efforts were not producing well-defined institutional 
patterns; (b) trade-offs between conflicting interests of “regional partners” and 
“nonmembers” were not favoring the former over the latter; and (c) decision-making 
demonstrated fragmented issue linkage (FIL) rather than the postulated disjointed 
incrementalism (DI).2 In the resultant turbulence, non-regional games, such as “sub-
national, national[,] . . . inter-regional, and global,” competed with the regional.3 He 
noted how two contending decision-making rationalities—DI and rational analytical 
(RA)—were not explaining European integration. Whereas DI takes place “under 
                                                 
1Ernst B. Haas, “Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration,” International 
Organization 30, no. 2 (Spring 1976): 177.  
2
Ibid., 173.  
3
Ibid., 179.  
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uncertainty” (“in a setting of bargaining among sets of participant with partly 
convergent and partly opposing interests”), RA is “bent on reducing uncertainty and 
routinizing collective decision-making so as to optimize outcomes for all.”4  Haas 
proposed FIL “to capture the tension of the other two rationalities . . . . [when] sharp 
dissatisfaction  procedures is manifest.”5 In other words, FIL “does not set in until there 
is a „crisis‟.” In the process, he set the stage for comparing not just other regional 
integrative efforts with the European Union, but also each of those integrative 
experiences itself over time. His three assumptions, I argue, feed upon themselves, 
harden over time, and complicate integrative pursuits beyond a point-of-no-return, so 
that in the final analysis, other endogenous and exogenous factors either rescued 
regional integration (as the European Union demonstrated after the 1990s), or exposed a 
better integrative alternative (as I show with North American dynamics since the 
1990s). While North America demonstrates how DI strains can coexist with FIL and 
West Europe the possibility of returning to DI from FIL, we also get exposed to how 
North American developmental differentials (an endogenous factor) and the West 
European shift from free-riding the political order to assuming political responsibilities 
(indicated by the 1986 Single European Act in response to the thawing of the Cold 
War—an exogenous factor) also catalyze regional economic integration. 
 Comparing regional blocs can be slippery and unenlightening unless the 
dimensions chosen are sufficiently neutral. Haas helps us again through his 
categorization of attributes. He constructed two of them: (a) the cognitive-perceptual 
attributes, such as the political objectives of actors, new knowledge being deployed, and 
how actors learn; and (b) institutional-behavioral attributes, such as tactical choices, 
collective bargaining styles, and the mechanisms utilized collectively for formulating 
                                                 
4
Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, CA: Institute of 
International Studies, 1976), 24.  
5
Ibid., 25.  
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and executing decisions. I turn to them after first depicting the assumptions just outlined 
in the case of North America. Table 1 guides this particular discussion. 
TABLE 1: 
HAAS’S INTEGRATIVE ASSUMPTIONS IN NORTH AMERICA 
Integrative Assumptions: Corresponding North American Dynamics: 
1. Institutional patterns from 
integrative efforts: 
*Several institutions built persist even as the future of NAFTA 
remains in limbo: CEC, CLC; dispute settlement mechanisms created 
by trade, investment, environmental, and labor provisions 
2. Trade-offs between members 
and non-members not helping 
members: 
*Largely ignored by NAFTA: though Chile was actively considered 
as NAFTA partner, attention drifted to the more opaque Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
3. Fragmented issue linkages 
displacing disjointed 
incrementalism: 
*Arguably emerging: Not there as yet to displace disjointed 
incrementalism 
 
Integration from Institutional Patterns: 
 There is no question that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
enhanced integration through institution-building: Institutions were formally created for 
behavior (policies, transactions) to fit in, rather than for behavior to assume a predictive 
pattern justifying the creation of institutions. 
Not only did NAFTA institutions open up new arenas of interaction, but the 
types of engagements also multiplied, evident most conspicuously through the dispute 
settlement arrangements in chapters 11, 19, and 20, but also in the two side-agreements 
(on the environment and labor). Yet, even though they introduced and expanded new 
types of collaboration among the three North American countries over the fifteen-years 
of NAFTA, the dynamics clung to inter-governmental forms of exchanges more than 
supranational,6 that is, enhancing interaction between governments rather than going 
beyond the state level to supranational institutions. It is not that supranational 
institutions were not created, but the inherently asymmetrical playground prevented full 
maximization of the opportunity they offered: The historical apprehension of being a 
                                                 
6
Andrew Moravscik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National interests and conventional 
statecraft in the European Community,” International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991):19-56.    
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U.S. neighbor or the tendency of Canada and Mexico to promote bilateral U.S. deals 
nipped the growth of trilateralism, and thereby convey the supranational pursuit was 
irreversible; and both self-seeking behavior blocked the supranational gateways the 
dispute settlement mechanisms created, for example, Chapter 19‟s binational panel, and 
the creation of a secretariat by each of the two side-agreements.  
While these point to endogenous dynamics, there were also exogenous 
dynamics: Unlike any member of the European Union, one NAFTA member clearly had 
global leadership claims at stake. That the United States accepted Canada‟s a1985 
proposal for a free-trade agreement and Mexico‟s 1990 proposal to extend the eventual 
Canadian-U.S. Free Trade Agreement into NAFTA was due more to the short-term 
frustration of the GATT‟s Uruguay Round stalemate rather than the long-term 
replacement of multilateralism. As the one country to push multilateralism from 1947, 
the United States had no desire to abandon it in 1985 or 1990 to Canada‟s or Mexico‟s 
proposal. Not surprisingly, even after NAFTA was implemented in 1994, the United 
States continued with its extra-regional pursuits—in the Western Hemisphere (the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas—FTAA); through competitive liberalism in Asia and 
Africa; and multilaterally (through the World Trade Organization—WTO).  
China simultaneously gate-crashing into global markets complicated these (for 
NAFTA members): China targeted the largest actual market in human history (the 
United States), the United States also targeted the largest potential market in human 
history (China). This was asymmetry at play—enough to slow the Canadian and 
Mexican enthusiasm displayed after 1985 for the former and after 1990 for the latter. 
Yet, it was not sufficient enough for Canada and Mexico to seek alternatives: Even 
though they were concluding FTAs, trade and investment continued to concentrate on 
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the United States Shopping around would come after 9/11—a circumstance completely 
unimaginable in West Europe. 
Two more relevant questions arise: (a) did NAFTA become top-heavy by 2008, 
that is, with more institutions than commensurate procedures to support them; and (b) 
why did the inter-governmental structure appeal to extra-regional opportunities? As the 
discussions below show, though there were ample procedural flows to strengthen the 
institutions, inadequate shifts in the supranational direction deprived NAFTA from 
comparative advantage claims. These discussions will also highlight the key constraints: 
political will; excessive asymmetry; non-zero sum extra-regional opportunities; and 
continued uncertainties reducing the DI-FIL gap. 
 Table 2 captures slices of NAFTA‟s institutional evolution. It specifies a variety 
of institutions created through chapters 11, 19, and 20 provisions, as well as by the side-
agreements. For instance, Chapter 11 created arbitral panels for investment disputes, 
Chapter 19 binational panels, and Chapter 20 the Free Trade Commission (FTC).  
TABLE 2: 
N.A.F.T.A.’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT INSTITUTIONS 
N.A.F.T.A.’s  CHAPTERS: INSTITUTIONS CREATED: 
Dispute Settlement: 
a. Chapter 11: 
b. Chapter 19: 
c. Chapter 20: 
 
a. arbitral tribunes 
b. binational panels, extraordinary challenge committees 
c. Free Trade Commission 
Side-agreements: 
a. Environment: 
 
b. Labor: 
 
a. Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC); 
Council of Ministers (COM) 
b. Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC);  
Council of Ministers (COM) 
 
Table 3 examines the new North American dispute settlement settings along 
thirteen dimensions, the first 7 addressing the various provisions, the last 6 exposing 
transnational and inter-governmental dynamics.  
TABLE 3: NAFTA, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,  & INSTITUTIONAL DESIGNS 
 
Parameters: Environment Labor Trade Investment Chapter 20: 
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1. Subject of 
Adjudication 
*Inconsistency in 
domestic laws 
*Inconsistency in 
domestic laws 
*ADDs/CVDs *Discrimination 
portfolio/FDI 
*Interpretation, 
treaty application 
2. Sources of 
Legitimacy: 
*Stockholm 
Principles 
*Rio Declaration 
*Domestic laws 
*ILO Convention 
 
*Domestic laws 
*GATT/WTO 
 
*Broader ICSID 
*UNCITRAL 
*Domestic laws 
*NAFTA 
*WTO 
3. Relevant 
Institutions 
Created: 
*COM/CEC 
*JPAC 
*Arbitral Panel 
*COM/CLC 
*NAO/NAC 
*Arbitral Panel 
*ECE 
*National admin- 
istrative agencies 
*Binational panel.  
*ECC. 
 
*Tribunal 
*FTC 
*Arbitral panel 
*Scientific 
review board 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Key 
Provisions: 
Side Agreement: 
*Article 22: 
Consultations 
(persistent flouting 
domestic laws) 
*23: Procedures 
*24-27: Arbitral 
panel formation, 
Roster, panelists 
*28: Rules of 
procedures 
*29: Third party 
participation 
*30: Role experts 
*31-34: Report and 
its implementation 
Side Agreement: 
*Article 27: Probe 
failure by any 
party to enforce 
ECE report 
*28: Procedures 
*29: Arbitral panel 
created 
*30: Roster for 
panel 
*31-35:Procedures 
of panel, selection 
of panelists 
*41: Suspension of 
benefits 
*Chapter 19: 
*Article 1901: 
scope: only goods, 
not services 
*1902: use of 
domestic relief 
laws 
*1903: partners 
may review of 
domestic rulings  
*1904: binational 
panel/ ECC appeal 
* 1905: authority  
to review domestic 
legislation 
* Chapter 11: 
*Articles 1116, 
1117: eligibility 
to file claims 
*1120: supra-
national sources  
*1121, 1122: 
waiver of right to 
domestic law 
*1123-25: 
constitution of 
tribunals 
*1134: nature of 
rulings, criteria 
to invoke Ch. 20 
*Chapter 20: 
*Article 2005: 
choice of fora 
*2007-2008: 
arbitral panel 
*2009-2111: on 
panelists 
*2014: seek 
information 
*2015: scientific 
review board 
*2019: 
suspension of 
benefits 
*Allows third 
parties 
 
 
5. Types of 
Rulings/ 
Deter-
minations: 
*Consultation, 
good offices, 
conciliation, med-
iation, recommen-
dations, arbitral 
panels, mutual 
solution, monetary 
penalty,  benefit 
suspension  
Consultation, 
Good offices, 
conciliation, 
mediation, 
recommendations, 
arbitral panels, 
mutual solution, 
monetary penalty, 
benefit suspension  
 
*Consultation, 
good offices, 
conciliation, 
mediation, 
recommendations, 
penalties, appeals 
 
 
*Consultation, 
good offices, 
conciliation, 
mediation, re-
commendations, 
penalties, appeals 
*Confidential 
 
 
*Consultation, 
good offices, 
conciliation, 
mediation 
*Arbitration 
*Confidential 
*No appeal 
 
6. Nature of 
Compliance: 
*Non-binding, but 
with penalties 
* Non-binding, but 
with penalties 
 
*Binding 
 
*Binding 
*Non-binding 
but retaliation 
permitted 
7. Exit option: *Yes, but costly *Yes, but costly *Yes, with 60-day 
notice 
*Not addressed *Not addressed 
8. Role of 
State: 
*Two-way conduit *Two-way conduit *Two-way conduit *Two-way 
conduit 
*Determinant, 
two-way too 
9. Role of 
NGOs 
     
10. 
Hypothesized 
role of  
Supranat’l 
Actor: 
 
*Process 
complaints 
 
*Adjudicator 
 
*Provide context 
for national laws 
 
*Apply rules 
directly 
 
*Provide context, 
alternative 
11. Relative 
Place of State: 
*Executive arm *Executive arm *Executive arm *Executive arm *Executive arm 
12. Relative 
place of 
NGOs: 
 
*Prosecutor 
 
*Prosecutor 
 
*Prosecutor 
 
*Prosecutor 
 
*Substantive 
engagements 
13. Relative 
Place of 
Supranat’l 
Actor: 
*Facilitator: but 
subject to 
executive arm 
*Facilitator: but 
subject to 
executive arm 
*Facilitator: but 
subject to 
executive arm 
*Facilitator: but 
subject to 
executive arm 
*More inter-
governmental 
than facilitator 
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 Cross-border complaints, raised particularly by non-government organizations 
(NGOs), are not only the hallmark of the five mechanisms, but also the tip of an 
influence iceberg. Table 3‟s first dimension specifies the subject of adjudication: Non-
compliance with domestic legislations for environmental and labor issues;7 against 
governmental discrimination for investment; specific unfair duties imposed, subsidies 
adopted, or prohibitive actions/legislations of a foreign government under Chapter 19;8 
or interpretational problems filed under Chapter 20. Inter-governmental/Supranational 
adjudication necessitated domestic legislative amendments. They had to become more 
transparent, parallel, and transnationally liable.9 As Stephen Zamora posits, this began 
the process of americanizing them.10 Legitimacy was derived from multilateral 
agreements for all arrangements, but domestic laws were pivotal in labor, trade, and 
investment dispute settlement considerations, while new collective institutions emerged, 
as recognized by the third dimension.  
 One notices the multilateral institutions being inter-governmental or 
transnational, rather than supranational. These include the Stockholm Principles of 1972 
                                                 
7
For environmental provisions, see Pierre Marc Johnson and André Beaulieu, The Environment 
and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing the New Continental Law (Washington, DC: Island Press, 
1996); and Stephen Mumme and Pamela Duncan, “The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and 
environmental management in the Americas,” Journal of Interamerican Studies & World Affairs 39, no.1 
(1997-8): 41-62. On labor, see Joaquim F. Otero, “The North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation: An assessment of its first year‟s implementation,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 
vol. 33 (1995): 637-62; U.S. Congress, Office of Technological Assessment, U.S.-Mexico Trade: Pulling 
Together or Pulling Apart? (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992) 77-96; and U.S.-
Mexico Law Institute, Third Annual Conference, Proceedings in U.S.-Mexico Law Journal, vol. 3 (1995).     
8
ADDs=anti-dumping duties; CVDs: countervailing duties.  On trade see Gilbert R. Winham and 
Heather Grant, Heather, “Antidumping and countervailing duties in regional trade agreements: Canada-
U.S. FTA, NAFTA, and beyond,” Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 3, no. 1 (Spring 1994):1-34; 
Huntington, David S. Huntington, “Settling disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 34, no. 2 (Spring 1993):407-43; and Ralph H. Folsom,  NAFTA in a 
Nutshell (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1999), ch. 8 particularly, but broadly 6,9,11.   
9
Winham, “What Mexico can expect from NAFTA Chapter 19: Review and dispute settlement in 
antidumping and countervailing matters,” Paper, El Colégio de Mexico, Mexico City, May 1994. 
10Stephen. Zamora, “The americanization of Mexican laws: Non-trade issues in North American 
Free Trade Agreement,” Law & Politics In International Business 24, no. 2 (1993):371-428.   
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(transnational-intergovernmental admixture),11 proliferating into the 1992 Rio Summit‟s 
Declaration on Environment and Development (transnational-intergovernmental 
admixture); the ILO Convention (intergovernmental);12 GATT/WTO anti-dumping and 
countervailing codes and procedures, GATT‟s Article XXIII and the WTO‟s Dispute 
Settlement Board (DSB);13 the ICSID Convention, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for investment;14 and NAFTA‟s national, international, 
and multilateral agreements for Chapter 20.15  
Taking the case of investment arrangements, they have tended to be more 
independent of state controls than the others. Article 1120 allows investors a choice of 
three multilateral types of arbitration: ICSID Convention, ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules of 1979, and UNCITRAL. Since Canada and Mexico are not ICSID contracting 
states, they can not use the ICSID Convention; ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 
adopted in 1979, can be used if, and only if, the dispute involves the United States; but 
in Canadian-Mexican disputes, or when several investment complaints are filed over a 
                                                 
11Allen L. Springer, “United States environmental policy and international law: Stockholm 
Principle 21 revisited,” in John E. Carroll (Ed.), International Environmental Diplomacy (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
 
12
As ranked by NAALC, these are: (1) freedom of association and protection of the right to 
organize; (2) right to bargain collectively; (3 ) right to strike; (4) prohibition of forced labor; (5) labor 
protections for children and young persons; (6) minimum employment standards; (7) elimination of 
employment discrimination; (8) equal pay for women and men; (9) prevention of occupational injuries 
and illness; (10) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; and (11) protection of 
migrant workers. From N.A.A.L.C. (n.d.).   
13
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “The dispute settlement system of the World trade Organization and 
the evolution of the GATT dispute settlement system since 1947,” Common Market Law Review 31, no. 
6 (December 1994):1157-1244. 
14
ICSID: International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dispute; UNCITRAL: United 
Nations Conference on International Trade Law. Although ICSID was established in 1965 under auspices 
of the World Bank and remains a state-to-state arbitration forum, NAFTA, interestingly, enhanced NGO 
participation. See Part III of Bruno (1997); Ibrahim F.I. Shihata and Antonio R. Parra, “The experiences 
of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes,” ICSID Review: Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 14, no. 2 (Fall 1999):299-361; and Folsom, Michael Wallace Gordon, and John A. 
Spanogle, Jr., International Trade and Investment (St. Paul. MN: West Publishing, Co., 1996) chps. 4-6. 
On investment-environmental overlap, see Aaron Cosbey, “NAFTA‟s Chapter 11 and the environment: A 
briefing paper for the CEC‟s Joint Public Advisory Committee,” from http://www.iisd.org/trade 
15
On Chapter 20, I relied on Frederick M. Abbott, “The North American integration regime and 
its implications for the world trading system” (1999), from: 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990202.html; David A. Gantz, “Dispute settlement under 
the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of forum opportunities and risks for the NAFTA parties,” American 
University International Law Review 14, no. 4 (1999):1025-1106. 
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single case, UNCITRAL alone provides the legal framework. Chapter Eleven promotes 
rule consolidation but prohibits delocalization,16 both arrangements having multilateral 
origins: Consolidation complaints can only be filed to the ICSID Secretary General, 
who may select arbitrators from the ICSID roster rather than NAFTA‟s; and 
delocalization is borrowed from ICSID Convention Article Twenty-six. 
These arrangements cover a wide range of case specificity.17 Antidumping or 
countervailing cases are the most specific and direct, labor and environmental 
complaints the most open-ended, since principles or issues like gender discrimination or 
threats to migratory birds, are more broadly felt, cover wider territory regardless of 
boundaries, and involve a more disparate network of social groups. Investment disputes 
slide up and down the scale of specificity depending on the degree of issue-sensitivity, 
for example, NAFTA‟s time-frame for denationalizing industries, introducing labor 
competitiveness, and uplifting environmental standards prickle Mexico more than the 
United States or Canada. Chapter Twenty cases can be both specific and general since 
interpretations touch narrow or wide issues, nationalistic or collective. 
One future source of legitimacy, precedential rulings, demonstrates the mutual 
respect for stare decisis in both civil and common law. A future implication of 
converging legal practices producing a unique legal personality is still debatable,18 even 
as nationalistic preferences or identities show signs of selective convergence already.  
Transnationalism is enhanced by institutional innovations, which may be: (a) 
intermediary institutions funneling complaints from the state to the supranational level, 
such as the 15-member Joint Public Action Committee (JPAC) for the environment or 
                                                 
16Term theoretically elaborated and applied by Robert Bruno, “Access of private parties to 
international dispute settlement: A comparative analysis,”  Jean Monnet Working Paper 13/97 (1997), 
from www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/papers/97/97-13.html;   
17Gary S. Horlick, “The U.S.-Canada FTA and GATT dispute settlement provisions: The 
litigant‟s view,” Journal of World Trade 26, no. 2 (April 1992):5-16.  
18
Not everyone believes so. For a dissenting environmentalist view, see Bradly J. Condon, 
“Consitutional law, trade policy, and the environment: Implications for North American environmental 
policy implementation in the 1990s,” Beyond NAFTA, 222-30.  
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the National Administrative Office (NAO) for labor; (b) rulings/determinations by 
arbitral panels for environment, labor, and interpretational issues, binational panels for 
unfair trading practices, and tribunals for investment; (c) administrative, like the North 
American secretariats established for environment and labor in Montreal and Dallas, 
respectively; or (d) inter-governmental, such as the council of ministers (COMs) for 
environment and labor, and the Chapter Twenty Free Trade Commission (FTC). These 
could become the founding institutions of a North American region if permitted 
unfettered growth. They also have their counterparts in the European Union. Yet, 
political constraints, to which I will return, haunt their growth.  
Institutions breed inclusiveness. Both the environmental JPAC and the labor 
NAO invite public participation, and collect and collate complaints, which not only 
open space for NGO engagement, but also transnationalize the policy-review process. 
The labor side-agreement also permits an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) to 
clarify enforcement measures, as well as publish and circulate information on 
controversial issues to the public, hold seminars, conferences, or exchanges as part of 
environmental/labor remedies, and provide preliminary adjudications for the COM. 
NAFTA‟s Chapter Nineteen differs from the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
precisely on this point: Although simultaneous anti-dumping and countervailing 
complaints may be filed to both, the former invites NGOs, whereas WTO‟s Dispute 
Settlement Board (DSB) is only for governments.
19
  
Panel constitution promotes professionalism over politics, collective rules over 
national, and societal representation over governmental, without entirely eliminating 
political, state, or governmental intervention. The Chapter Nineteen binational panel, 
                                                 
19More on this point in Frederick M. Abbott, “The North American integration regime and its 
implications for the world trading system” (1999, Section II); and 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990202.html; and David A. Gantz, “Dispute settlement 
under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of forum opportunities and risks for the NAFTA parties,” 
American University International Law Review 14, no. 4 (1999):1025-1106. 
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Chapter Eleven tribunal, and arbitral panels for both environment and labor demonstrate 
these markedly.  Being professional largely means experiences or training in related 
jobs, such as being a judge or lawyer. A noteworthy anti-dumping dispute innovation, 
Chapter Nineteen‟s binational panel consists of 5 members, 2 representing the country 
being hurt by discrimination, 2 from the country causing the discriminating case, and 
the fifth chosen by the two disputing countries together.20 When NAFTA was 
implemented from January 1, 1994, each member country submitted a roster of 25 
names to the NAFTA Secretariat; and likewise for the 3-member Extraordinary 
Challenge Committee (ECC), constituted from a roster of 10 submitted by each 
government. Investment tribunals also involve 3 members chosen from a 15-member 
roster which each country submits 5 names to; and labor/environmental arbitral panels 
similarly evolve from 15-members rosters producing 5-member panels. Chapter 
Twenty‟s 5-member arbitral panels utilize reverse selection: In the case of two countries 
being involved, 2  panelists are chosen from the complaining country by the country 
against which a complaint is made, 2 is similarly chosen by the country which files the 
complaint from the country it is complaining against, while both governments chose the 
fifth panelist, usually from the third country; if the complaint involves all three 
countries, the defendant country chooses 1 from each of the other two countries, the 
complaining country chooses 2 from the country it is complaining against, and a fifth is 
chosen collectively. All selections are made from the 30-strong Chapter 20 roster, to 
which each country contributes equally. Controlling nationalistic or patriotic loyalties of 
panelists, as too the tendency of governments to screen the selection list, is next to 
impossible, but the attempt to reduce politics is noteworthy. It places the NAFTA panels 
                                                 
20
United States Trade Representative, Correcting the Record: Response of the Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative to the Perot/Choate NAFTA Book (Washington, DC: USTR, September 2, 1993), 
59. 
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a cut above the WTO‟s DSB where consensus rather than majority voting, exclusive 
state engagement, and political interests remain prominently above rules. 
Chapter Eleven not only provides a smaller roster than Chapter Nineteen, but in 
case of difficulty in forming a tribunal within ninety-days, the ICSID Secretary General 
intervenes. S/He may turn to the larger ICSID Panel of Arbitrators to which each World 
Bank member supplies at least three professionals, but if so, the presiding arbitrator 
cannot be chosen from the disputing NAFTA countries. Chapter Eleven is also the most 
secretive NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism. Deliberations need not be open, and 
information need not be publicized. It remains the NAFTA dispute settlement black 
sheep: Not only does it rely on multilateral sources of law, but it also places rules above 
state control, thus insulating itself from the domestic biases other NAFTA dispute 
settlement mechanisms must battle. 
 Key dispute settlement provisions, listed in the fourth dimension, stipulate the 
purposes, procedures for filing complaints and panel formation, rights and obligations, 
and other relevant information, such as the nature of recourse to other rules. They link 
the state, NGOs, and supranationalist interests without giving any one set an overriding 
capacity or veto power, yet at the same time encouraging the growth and participation 
of NGOs and supranational entities alike without significantly diminishing the salience 
of the states.  
 The fifth and sixth dimensions address the rulings/determinations and nature of 
compliance, respectively. In all 4 mechanisms cross-border complaints are initiated by 
private groups, usually against a specific discriminatory policy action, condition, or 
legislation of another country under chapters 11 and 19, while the labor and 
environmental side-agreements also allow citizens to challenge their own government.  
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Behind the considerable convergences is an unmistakable but unavoidable 
americanization: The onus of adjustments falls more heavily on Canada and Mexico, 
implying the capability of the United States to rock the integration boat more if Canada 
or Mexico falters. Key to understanding this unevenness is the relationship between 
regional integration and each state‟s constitution. NAFTA safeguards constitutional 
provisions and sensitive sectors in all 3 countries. These include culture in Canada, 
Mexican petroleum, or U.S. security industries,21 for example; on the other hand, certain 
constitutional provisions have been selectively modified to promote regional free trade, 
such as Mexico withdrawing Article Twenty-seven collective land-ownership in order 
to promote private enterprise. The United States has its own safeguards. If the 
integrative process proves damaging, at least two U.S. constitutional provisions offer 
exit options:  The Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, 
by which U.S. laws can only be examined by U.S. officials, and Article III, Section 1, 
which invests judicial authority in the U.S. judiciary, not the NAFTA panels. 
Ratification, one might argue, automatically converts an international agreement into 
domestic law; but this does not diminish constitutional controversies or roadblocks, and 
when it does not in actual cases, size could easily determine the outcome, with the more 
powerful country imposing its own domestic laws over collective compacts. 
NAFTA‟s multifaceted settlement procedures reflect adjustments to the 
increasing complexity of issues, but state-to-state disputes continue to be negotiated 
privately, often excluding NGOs, and with more inflexible rules, as illustrated by the 
WTO‟s DSB. NGO engagement, by contrast, loosens the procedures. Only the Chapter 
Nineteen EEC offers the equivalence of an appeals court, but whose scope is 
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Alan M. Rugman and Michael Gestrin, “NAFTA‟s treatment of foreign investment,” in 
Rugman (Ed.), Foreign Investment and NAFTA (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 
1994), 46-79. 
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nevertheless severely restricted to procedural inconsistencies or unprofessionalism on 
the part of any participant, rather than appealing the ruling itself. 
 NAFTA‟s dispute settlement arrangements create lock-ins by increasing 
opportunity costs. These are evident in stipulations for non-compliance and penalties. 
Chapter Nineteen allows an aggrieved country to withdraw from NAFTA with a sixty-
day notice—an option too costly to pursue in North America where Canada and Mexico 
remain two of the three largest U.S. trading partners; since investment is more job-
creating than job-diverting, and is premised upon multilateral or international rules 
rather than regional, Chapter Eleven does not facilitate exit, given the size of 
multilateral membership; and both environmental and labor side-agreements are non-
binding, even though non-compliance imposes escalating costs on trading within North 
America, with the ultimate sanction being wider NAFTA suspension of benefits.  
Turning to penalties, investment arrangements cannot award punitive damages 
like the other three, only material damages. Since investment determinations and 
consolidation rulings involve two quite distinctive, though cumulative procedures, 
Chapter Eleven decisions become paradoxically secretive, inhibititive, and specific. 
Chapter Nineteen has its own self-inflicted limitation. Although the only antidumping 
or countervailing claim acceptable is against the exporting country, the binational panel 
ruling may still apply to more than one exporting firm; yet, if two countries have an 
identical complaint, they must file separate cases, rather than join forces. Chapter 
Nineteen does not have any consolidation or delocalization rules. 
The last six dimensions convey the interactive role of states, societal groups, and 
supranational arrangements in the policy-making transmission belt. Whereas the first 
three focus on the roles of each type of actor, the second three comment on the relative 
place of each under the specific mechanism. All three actors perform complementary 
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roles: NGOs bring the complaints, states coordinate them, 
intergovernmental/supranational arrangements serve as a jury. In general legal parlance, 
NGOs prosecute, states largely defend, while intergovernmental/supranational 
institutions judge or facilitate.22  This division of labor is crucial to balancing the dispute 
settlement mechanisms.  
We note how each mechanism (a) proceeded from, and was largely dominated 
by, an inter-governmental premise; (b) sowed the seeds of supranational outgrowths 
without any significant outgrowth; (c) adjudicated enough cases as to acquire the 
needed experiences in collective action against nationalistic constraints; and (d) 
softened the more acrimonious prior approaches to dispute settlement. They were not 
picture-perfect and could not overcome two North American constraints: (a) the 
overpowering role of national interests; and (b) the inherent asymmetry favoring the 
United States. In spite of these two political constraints, they explored spaces “beyond 
the nation-state”, and that they have not been fully abandoned suggests how they could 
play a role as pillars of future institution-building. 
NAFTA‟s institutions expose a pertinent integrative dilemma: Institutions need 
political will to generate forward integrative linkages. In other words, although modest 
bureaucracies have evolved around each of these mechanisms, without a distinctive 
political drive to sustain the various chapter-specific procedures/provisions, the strength 
of self-serving national interests could undermine collective action; and it is not 
necessarily the dispute settlement rulings but rather the economic and political value of 
North American integration, that could determine their future. 
Member-Non-Member Trade-offs: 
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Lynne Rienner, 1986), 85-91.   
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 By and large, this Haas assumption has been ignored by NAFTA, with 
especially its largest member, the United States, believing extra-regional arrangements 
represent non-zero-sum opportunities (and clearly a step towards multilateralism). On 
the one hand, the degrees of commitment to a regional trading bloc by Canada, Mexico, 
and the United States vary too much to say with certainty what the final outcome must 
be: Canada was reluctant in 1990-1 to let Mexico into the bilateral trade agreement it 
had chalked out with the United States in 1989;23 Mexico‟s blind placement of all its 
eggs into the North American baskets after 1994 led to foot-dragging on admitting Chile 
as a fourth amigo;24 and while the United States merrily forged several other FTAs, 
suggesting a plurilateral or multilateral final goal,25 Mexico did the same without 
reducing its North American (of U.S.) priority.26 In short, NAFTA thus far has not 
necessarily been diminished when multiple other commitments grow: This is evident in 
intra-NAFTA and extra-NAFTA trade expansion between 1994 and 2008, and in the 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers. 
 On the other hand, the record of handling would-be members has been 
discouraging for a regional identity. As just observed, Canada was initially reluctant to 
admit Mexico, but Mexico itself was reluctant to promote Chile‟s membership. Of 
course, Mexico‟s reluctance did not kill Chile‟s chances: fears of the U.S. fast-track 
authority did, indicating unilateral action to be an even more formidable barrier to North 
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American bilateralism.27 It was more prudent for the United States to pursue the FTAA 
from the various Summit of the America (SOA) gatherings than to selectively seek 
Chile‟s NAFTA admission. Keeping Chile out, in turn, could have strengthened or 
deepened NAFTA, but the time and effort put into FTAA shifted attention from 
NAFTA. 
 In the final analysis, relations with non-NAFTA members were pursued very 
unevenly: Canada never abandoned its desire to diversify trading/investment partners, 
even though trade relations with the United States and Mexico expanded; Mexico did 
not want to diversify partners during the NAFTA years, even after concluding more free 
trade agreements than any other countries in the world; and the United States, like 
Canada, sought partner diversification with non-zero-sum expectations—clearly a step 
towards the multilateralism the European Union has wanted to side-step. 
Fragmented Linkages over Disjointed Incrementalism: 
 That the political will to develop and deepen a distinctive North American 
regional identity is either absent or weak was vividly exposed by the inability of the 
three NAFTA members to prepare a sequel to NAFTA. When the 15-year NAFTA 
lapsed in December 2008, Canada was busy evaluating a trade agreement with the 
European Union, Mexico just started to explore the rest of the world as possible 
partners, and the United States had already walled off one-third of its border with 
Mexico (for security and cultural reasons rather than economic). There had been, though 
currently there are no, discussions for a customs union or a common currency. In other 
words, though incrementalism stopped being a North American priority, even in 
disjointed form, evolving linkages, in fragmented form, could eventually bridge the gap 
(between the presence of multiple institutions based on certainty, as the RA paradigm 
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Enterprise Institute Outlook Series, July 1996, from: http://www.aei.org/outlook/6802   
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postulates, and the indifference towards institutions based on uncertainty, as FIL 
predicts). 
 Some of these linkages existed before NAFTA, others emerged in its aftermath; 
some of them contribute positively to North American economic integration, others 
obstruct that goal. One positive pre-NAFTA linkage includes the maquiladora form of 
industrial integration. Created by the 1965 Border Industrialization Program (BIP), 
maquila plants in Mexico served two broad purposes: reduce production costs of U.S. 
manufacturers, thus keeping them competitive against particularly Japanese automobile 
firms; and mitigate illegal Mexican emigration to the United States. Exploiting Mexican 
low wages, many U.S. factories were shifted south, with the automobile corporations 
leading the way—a development consistent with Charles Pentland‟s proposition that the 
first stage of regional economic integration ought to be, not free trade agreements, but 
sectoral integration.28 This was arguably true of the European Community‟s evolution 
from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), then making the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) pivotal to integrating West European countries, just as 
NAFTA‟s origin may be traced unevenly to BIP or CUFTA‟s origin to the 1965 
Canada-U.S. Auto Pact. The long-term hope of incremental wage increases in Mexico 
eventually standardizing production prices across the two countries did not become 
reality as successive sexenio crises prevented Mexico from significantly crossing any 
developmental thresholds.29 Nevertheless, the maquila industry graduated from its low-
wage origin towards hi-tech manufacture, and shifted its fulcrum from the border 
towards Guadalajara, then the Puebla area, and ultimately, through the Plan Puebla 
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Panama and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), towards Mexico‟s 
south, en route to Central America.30 
 Among the positive post-NAFTA linkages, dispute settlement arrangements rank 
high, as discussed previously. So too trade and investment flows: both show enormous 
increases between 1994 and 2008, as well as diversification into new arenas. While 
these strengthen the economic foundations of integration, they obviously did not serve 
as the necessary conditions of economic integration. 
 One negative pre-NAFTA linkage, and probably the ghost haunting NAFTA the 
most today, is illegal Mexican migration. Keeping human flows across national 
boundaries out of NAFTA may have stumped NAFTA from the start. At any rate, 
NAFTA would probably never have been ratified in the U.S. Congress had human flows 
been permitted as they were in West Europe almost from the start. Although maquila 
plants multiplied over time, they never really touched more than the tip of the 
emigration iceberg.  In fact, one of the most voluminous waves of illegal Mexican 
emigration hugged NAFTA—not only throughout the 1990s when the United States 
registered its longest period of economic growth in the entire twentieth century, but also 
against the formidable barriers established by the United States after 9/11. To the U.S. 
public, this perceptual correlation was all that was needed to block any NAFTA 
development. 
 Finally, one negative post-NAFTA linkage has been U.S. assertiveness. While 
North American asymmetry had always bothered Canada and Mexico from at least 
World War II, the post-9/11 U.S. philosophical orientation added more salt to the 
wound. Ingratiating policy preferences (“with us or against us,” for instance) not only 
replaced the amity evident since George H. W. Bush‟s desire to integrate the 
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hemisphere from “Alaska to Tierra del Fuego,” but also climaxed with the building of 
border walls much to Mexico‟s displeasure. With this changed outlook, the trilateralism 
NAFTA earnestly sought to cultivate gave way to an even more strident form of North 
American bilateralism: both Canada and Mexico have sought this version of relations 
with the United States. 
 In summary, then, North American incrementalism is more in substance (the 
1965 sectoral integration incrementally culminating in spiraling trade and investment 
flows under NAFTA) than in spirit. As such, though NAFTA satisfies key the 
characteristics of regional integration, its sticky feet to evolve beyond the free-trade 
stage and inter-governmental structures is more political and structural (irremediable 
asymmetry) than economic; and even when it is economic, at least Canada and the 
United States have shown extra-regional pursuits do not have to be zero-sum, thus, are 
strongly encouraged. Political decisions not only keep integrative efforts more 
fragmented than disjointed, but also increasingly so. The alternate preference, 
particularly in the United States, need not be nationalism but multilateralism (though 
after the recession, it is very hard to discount nationalism), that is, piece all the isolated 
free-trade agreements into one comprehensive arrangement. Both Canada and the 
United States have frequently toyed with the two options, again isolating Mexico whose 
deep history of nationalism does not match its relatively weak multilateral history. 
 Against that backdrop, it is useful to evaluate North American integrative efforts 
against Haas‟s cognitive-perceptual and institutional-behavioral attributes. Table 4 
summarizes the discussions.. 
TABLE 4: 
HAAS’S TWO COMPARATIVE SETS OF ATTRIBUTES 
Comparative Attributes: Corresponding North American Dynamics: 
Cognitive-Perceptual: 
a. political objectives of 
 
a. more convergent than divergent until 9/11, more divergent 
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actors: 
b. new knowledge 
emerging: 
c. how actors learn: 
than convergent thereafter 
b. true until 9/11, after which Cold War perceptions, 
instruments, and expectations were revived 
c. new learning until 9/11, stalemate thereafter 
Institutional-behavioral: 
a. tactical choices: 
b. collective bargaining 
styles: 
c. mechanisms 
collectively utilized: 
 
a. unable/unwilling to go beyond to strategic thinking 
b. embedded bilateralism infrequently explaining trilateralism: 
more DI than RA or FIL 
c. in principle, yet; but subject to state gate-keeping  
(inter-governmentalism again) 
 
 Cognitive-perceptual attributes boil down to the political objectives actors seek, 
the new knowledge emerging from integrative efforts, and how actors learn. With 9/11 
as the NAFTA dividing line, political objectives of the three actors have not only 
emerged from the shadows, but have also sharpened and diverged, with the United 
States setting the pace: Its full commitment to the Bush Doctrine tenets just when 
NAFTA had reached sore sort of a regional take-off stage diverted attention and 
resources away from NAFTA. There was a feeble attempt to resuscitate the FTAA 
movement, but military security rather than economic integration stole the show. 
Canada adjusted to it selectively (deploying combat troops to Afghanistan but not Iraq), 
Mexico did not—and would not when a border-wall was in the works. 
 In turn, the new knowledge emerging took a different course: Before 9/11 
emerging NAFTA institutions supplied lots of new behavioral patterns to absorb or 
adjust to, for example, fulfilling the requirements to prevent trade, investment, labor, or 
environmental disputes. Just when these were beginning to mature (and thereby become 
more permanently institutionalized), 9/11 intervened, imposing a different set of 
behavioral patterns and circumstances. This was more than an agenda shift: Trade and 
economic matters were thrust into a dispensable category, while military security 
interests assumed a permanent trajectory. In other words, Cold War perceptions, 
instruments, and expectations were not only revived, but they also displaced economic 
counterparts. 
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 Against these developments, digesting NAFTA slipped down the priority list. If 
new learning did occur, it was more prominent in the negative sense: what to avoid 
rather than what to promote. The United States specifically disentangled human flows 
from economic (evident in constructing border walls to keep illegal immigrants out, 
creating a slippery slope to retaliatory gestures with Mexico), thus crippling regional 
economic integration, and Mexico‟s desire to see them together as part of a single 
package was disrupted by its war on drugs from December 2006 (which is commanding 
too many resources and inflicting too high casualties to make regional economic 
integration viable). Since this war exposed the role of money-laundering and weapons 
smuggling, even routine NAFTA flows (trade and investment) had to be subordinated to 
new concerns (which had no relations with NAFTA). 
 Institutional-behavioral attributes boil down to tactical choices, collective 
bargaining style, and mechanisms collectively utilized. Here the story is more promising 
but still subjected to the subjective political will to make these attributes meaningful. 
 Resolving disputes through NAFTA‟s mechanisms involve tactical choices: 
pooling evidences against benchmarks even though disparately interpreted. This 
behavioral pattern was put into motion by NAFTA mechanisms, as just discussed, but 
overtaken by other 9/11-related subsequent priorities. Institutions were created to 
anchor such behavior, but their strength remains subject to the political will of whether 
they are important to larger goals or not: Canadian lumbermen, Mexican maize growers, 
and U.S. citrus fruit producers can (a) exert a lot of political pressures in elections for 
their interests; (b) extract a lot of concessions against cheaper imports; and (c) 
emasculate NAFTA thread by thread. No Political gesture has convincingly eliminated 
these sectional interests to predict NAFTA will smoothly flow into the next regional 
integration phase. 
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 Those same dispute settlement mechanisms also created space for collective 
bargaining, the styles emerging wherefrom also became stillborn. By and large, the 
bilateral basis of NAFTA (three bilateral agreements rather than one trilateral) 
continued to define interaction (in large part because many of the disputes were 
themselves bilateral), but the occasion for trilateral experimentation was not ignored, 
and with it went hopes (not institutions) of supranationalism. Without those 
supranational hopes (as was so evident in West Europe owing to the works of Haas—
exposing one North American missing link), supranational institutions do not stand a 
chance.  
 These collective bargaining forms depicted DI (atmosphere of uncertainty) 
rather than RA (atmosphere of certainty and routine) or FIL (mixed atmosphere), more 
so before 9/11 than after. Yet, this gets to the heart of the NAFTA problem as a regional 
trading bloc: 9/11 introduced the kind of “crisis” fitting Haas‟s bill, but the response to 
it was unilateral (by the United States, rather than bilaterally or trilaterally—even 
though bilateral security arrangements made by the United States with its two land 
neighbors, they were unilaterally determined: Mexico refused to join the war on terror, 
and both Canada and Mexico opposed the 2003 war in Iraq). 
 Finally, these mechanisms were being collectively utilized before and after 9/11, 
the key difference being that the expectations were higher before 9/11 than after. They 
remained operational even after NAFTA lapsed in December 2008. Leaving them 
operational instead of strengthening them not only weakens any supranational 
expectation, but also opens the door for a stagnation crisis over time. 
 Just as the European Community‟s 1965 empty-chair crisis was a game-changer 
for West European integration, so too has 9/11 been a game-changer for North 
American integration. Unlike West Europe, which had a coal and steel community 
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functioning adequately, North America did not have sufficiently functional collective 
organizations by the time 9/11 descended; and with a steeper form of asymmetry among 
members, North American had a harder time adjusting to the changes. 
Transatlantic Comparisons: 
 What light can be squeezed from Haas‟s integrative assumptions and attributes? 
Tables 5 and 6 superficially compare and contrast the West European and North 
American experiences along these lines, while Table 7 does likewise in terms of the 
“new knowledge” this study generated. 
Haas’s Assumptions: 
 As a backdrop to Table 5, West European integrative efforts show greater 
accomplishments in the early 21
st
 Century than in the 1970s when Haas‟s 
disillusionment overcame his early expectations. The Community he found, bounded by 
fragmented links, is now an Economic Union with at least three times as many members 
and a largely subscribed currency. On the other hand, NAFTA might be facing the same 
“crisis” constraints now that Haas observed in the European Community of the early 
1970s. One of the key difference might be the presence/absence of a superpower 
member: West Europe did not have one, was less asymmetrically inclined, and therefore 
found regionalism being constrained largely by nationalistic preferences; yet, 
contrariwise, North America with a superpower, and therefore, interests that went 
beyond the region and economic integration, found regionalism being constrained not 
only by nationalistic preferences but extra-regional as well, such as hemispheric (U.S. 
anti-Cuba stance), transatlantic (NATO), global (U.S. anti-terror war), and so forth.  
TABLE 5: 
HAAS’S INTEGRATIVE ASSUMPTIONS IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXTS 
Integrative 
Assumptions: 
West European Dynamics: North American Dynamics: 
1. Institutional patterns Blossoming and fortifying At a post-9/11 stalemate: but at 
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from integrative efforts: higher threshold than before NAFTA 
2. Trade-offs between 
members and non-
members not helping 
members: 
 
Not the case 
 
Reality 
3. Fragmented issue 
linkages displacing 
disjointed 
incrementalism: 
 
DI prevalent and strengthening 
over time 
 
DI prevalent but stalemate 
encourages future FIL takeover 
 
Yet, North America might not be bailed out of its “turbulence” the way the 
EC/EU was after its 1970 “turbulence”. On the one hand, that might not be a collective 
goal. On the other, security considerations impose direct engagements and costs in 
North America than they did in the West Europe of the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and part of 
the 1980s, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), more precisely, the 
United States, picked up the tab. Thirdly, other extra-regional and sub-regional 
(nationalist) forces may be more attractive. Finally, regional integration would have to 
be reconstructed to replace economic symmetry for asymmetry, an unlikely present 
expectation. 
 In terms of institutional patterns, the EU is far more advanced today, without 
becoming the poster-card for regional economic integration, while North American 
institutions, remain uncomfortably stranded at some plateau since 9/11, though this 
level is higher than where it was before NAFTA. For example, the EU can now shift 
priorities from economic institutions to Common Security and Foreign Policy 
institutions and a chief executive, not to mention the currency alluded to previously. 
North American countries might find regionalism second-best to extra-regional 
arrangements, which was not a West European consideration of the 1970s: Not only 
U.S. global interests triggered by 9/11, but also technological development, and China‟s 
entry into global trading/investing networks, might make going “beyond regional 
integration” more feasible than remaining with or consolidating NAFTA. 
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 Trade-offs between members and non-members not helping members, as in the 
second dimension, have become a North American reality, but not necessarily so across 
West Europe. Mexico displaced Japan as the second largest U.S. trading partner after 
NAFTA was implemented only to be displaced from that coveted spot by a non-
NAFTA member, China, in 2003. Though Mexico‟s trade with the United States was 
not disrupted by this, clearly the United States is open to look beyond NAFTA, as too 
Canada with its transatlantic pursuits—forcing Mexico to put more beef into its multiple 
FTAs concluded since becoming a NAFTA member but left to simply languish during 
the NAFTA honeymoon years. Though isolated EU members do look beyond West 
Europe, such as Britain, by and large EU members have a lot at stake within West 
Europe to want to subordinate these to extra-regional interests. 
 Finally, arguably West Europe may have more DI than FIL dynamics today than 
in the 1970s—and North American today. Fragmenting issues in a regional organization 
with only three members could lead to irreparably weakening it; and with U.S. 
preferences demanding more Canadian and Mexican attention, FIL might not become 
an issue, at least strategically, in the near future. Besides, DI appeals to a regional bloc 
consisting of high-wage and low-wage members: disparities of the kind lubricate DI. As 
such, both regions might find a rare similarity. 
Attributes Compared: 
 Pitting the two blocs against each other over attributes, Table 6 shows greater 
cognitive-perceptual dissimilarities, and modified institutional-behavioral variances 
with similar collective bargaining styles.  
TABLE 6: 
HAAS’S TWO COMPARATIVE SETS OF ATTRIBUTES 
Comparative Attributes: 21
st
 Century West European 
Dynamics: 
NAFTA-based North American 
Dynamics: 
Cognitive-Perceptual:   
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a. political 
objectives of 
actors: 
b. new knowledge 
emerging: 
c. how actors 
learn: 
a. more convergent than 
divergent 
 
b. yes, through DI 
 
 
c. constant factor with new and 
wait-listed members 
a. more post-9/11 divergences 
than convergences 
 
b. not necessarily: revived knowledge 
at the expense of new knowledge 
 
c. individually more than collectively 
Institutional-behavioral: 
a. tactical choices: 
 
b.  collective 
bargaining 
styles: 
c. mechanisms 
collectively 
utilized: 
 
 
a. always there, but also 
influencing strategic 
outcomes 
b. more DI than FIL 
 
 
c. increasing and diversifying 
 
 
a. increasingly there but not 
converting into strategic 
outcomes 
b. more DI than for now: but 
unilateralism may reverse 
situation 
c.  minimal, and no growth 
 
 Converging political objectives pushed West European countries from the 
Community form of integration towards the Union counterpart; and yet, though NAFTA 
promised a similar movement towards converging political objectives in the 1990s, 9/11 
set into motion serious divergences across North America. Among the consequences, 
new knowledge had to be constantly generated in the EC/EU to back up this shift (such 
as the Maastricht Treaty‟s Euro provisions), while expanding membership, including 
those on the waiting-list, had to learn EU rules, regulations, principles, and decision-
making authorities, and, in short, its culture. The atmosphere to do so across North 
America was just not there convincingly: Just as the initial years expanded hopes of 
new knowledge, 9/11 and the entry of China into global markets constrained them, the 
former severely by reviving the security-based combat instincts, institutions, and 
expectations of the Cold War era, the latter by suggesting a promising type of 
integration beyond the region. 
 Turning to the institutional-behavioral dimension, though the resort to tactical 
choices remains constant to both arenas (containing single-country defection, for 
example), only in West Europe have these choices built into strategic outcomes (the 
Euro being a clear example, since opt-out provisions permitted members to refrain from 
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adopting it). Across North America, in turn, the opportunities evaporated, leaving 
countries to make nationalistic or retaliatory decisions (Mexico imposing tariffs on U.S. 
farm products to retaliate the U.S. restrictions on Mexican trucks plying on U.S. 
highways), while not only do they not add up to any strategic outcome but they also 
throttle the very possibility of collective strategic choices.  
 Yet, in both arenas, DI seems to be prevailing over FIL. A string of common 
West European policies indicate the FIL reversal very robustly from the “turbulent” 
1970s, even though the 2007-9 recession threatened to push many EU members back to 
FIL type of bargaining. This may be more difficult now precisely because more 
common institutions anchor EU dynamics than ever before, even though their 
emergence was not as linear as RA proponents would have liked. EU‟s opt-out 
provision exemplifies the concessions and compromises made between an increasing 
number of members to get to the expected goal. Across North America, DI was the 
catalytic integrative force, only to be checked by 9/11. Since then, it has mixed and 
mingled with U.S. unilateralism and FIL in determining outcomes. 
 Finally for Table 6, the mechanisms collectively utilized have been expanding 
across West Europe without really getting to first-base convincingly in North America. 
This may be a tipping-point consideration: The more common policies and institutions, 
the stronger DI possibilities, as in West Europe; but, contrariwise, stalled or stunted 
growth, as in North America, may result in atrophied policies and institutions, pushing 
DI towards fragmentation. 
Learning From North American Experiences: 
 What lessons can be learned from the North American experiment with regional 
integration, just as we learned plenty from the now weak Haas assumptions and 
attributes from West Europe? 
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 Table 7 presents a suggestive list of North American constraints of possible 
relevance elsewhere in comparative perspectives. Four North American constraints, 
drawn from the above discussions, are discussed below. 
TABLE 7: 
NORTH AMERICAN CONSTRAINTS TO REGIONALISM 
Constraints: West Europe: North America: 
1. Political will (relative of 
economic will): 
More convergences than 
divergences 
More divergences than 
convergences 
2. Asymmetry driven too far: Difficult to attempt with 
membership expanding: 
coalitions appealing 
Very much reality: hegemony 
suggested 
3. Non-zero-sum extra-regional 
opportunities: 
Strong enough to resist this, but 
with technological growth, 
future contestation expected 
Very attractive option, with U.S. 
fully open to explore them 
4. Trade-off between increased 
uncertainties (DI) and 
attentuating institutions (FIL): 
With robust common 
institutions, EU more likely to 
strengthen DI 
With common institutions in a 
stalemate, NAFTA more likely 
to drift to FIL from DI 
 
 The first is political will, not in its absolute sense, but relative to economic will 
(to integrate fully from a free-trade premise). Since it is a variable, much depends on the 
progress made with the economic will; and since economic will is more linear and 
specific, the variability of political will also increases. Nevertheless, whereas the EU 
has shown the capacity to streamline its political will with its economic counterpart, we 
see more common policies and institutions, as well as the attainment of higher 
integrative thresholds. On the other hand, since North America remains divided over 
political will (or at least Canada and Mexico being suspicious of their relatively stronger 
partner‟s preferences), even if the economic will was there, turbulence may constantly 
lurk around the corner. Since the economic will is itself shaky (allowing NAFTA to 
lapse, for example, after fulfilling its term), political will is harder to develop. One 
consequence might be, just as the EU reached the final integrative post theoretically, 
North America may simply opt out of integrating at the free-trade level. This may be 
less disruptive than expected, since extant forms of regional integration will only be 
joined, rather than replaced, by newer, broader forms. 
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 Asymmetry, the second constraint, is of diminishing apprehension in WE but an 
increasing NA force—another reason to strengthen integration in the former while 
reducing possibilities in the latter. The more the EU members, the less likely a German 
(or French, or Franco-German) axis will pin EU‟s future. We have noticed increasing 
strains in the Franco-German axis, while the 2006-9 recession exposed the weakness of 
relying on the heavy-weights. Furthermore, the more the members, the more the 
chances for coalition build-up within the EU, mollifying existing asymmetrical 
pressures and preferences. 
 The same cannot be said of North America: With its three members, one 
coalition may be theoretically possible (Canada-Mexico), but practically meaningless 
against the United States; in turn, strengthening U.S. asymmetrical pressures and 
preferences, evident more vividly after 9/11. Rather than coalition-building, North 
American patterns could easily promote hegemonic structuring. Collective bargaining 
differs significantly between coalitions and hegemony. 
 Third, non-zero-sum extra-regional attractions are likely to become a North 
American threat than West European, at least for the near future. In part, this is due to 
membership: the more the members, the less the attraction to conclude extra-regional 
arrangements, even though for export purposes, extra-regional markets will continue to 
be sought. In part this is due to the degree of asymmetry: the more asymmetrical the 
region and the member benefiting from that asymmetry prefers extra-regional 
arrangements, the more the possibility of the regional bloc shifting in that direction. 
How the China-U.S. economic relation plays out could prove critical to the future of 
NAFTA: Will the United States retreat from that relationship because of China‟s 
currency manipulation, and strengthen (or broaden) NAFTA? Or will the United States 
seek other global partners to nullify China‟s growing presence, at the expense of 
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NAFTA? Or will the United States go in all directions simultaneously, as George W. 
Bush‟s competitive liberalism policy approach sought to do? 
 Finally, the inevitability of a trade-off between DI and institutional health 
suggests future NA problems but WE promises. That trade-off is likely to favor DI over 
FIA in Europe because uncertainties are likely to continue, even multiply, but unlikely 
to overpower the EU owing to its several common policies and institutions. On the other 
hand, the trade-off is likely to introduce FIA dynamics across NA in the near future if 
extant institutions are not strengthened and new ones put into place. In this sense, and 
this sense only, NA today resembles the WE Haas lamented about forty-years ago. 
Nevertheless, NA regionalism carries fewer future projects than WE regionalism forty-
years ago. The critical factor may just be how these four constraints played out in WE 
then and NA now. 
Conclusions: 
 The weakness of Haas‟s assumptions and attributes to West European and North 
American today reveals why they are so crucial tools to scholars today: Like the 
children of Hamelin, we would continue humming until we also run out of a voice, in 
our case, to the regional integration rhythm. As we, stop and reflect, a few arguments 
stand out from the realities before us. 
 First, regional economic integration worked, and worked very well, despite 
Haas‟s second thoughts, in that one part of the world where he had given up hope: West 
Europe. It might work elsewhere, but in small communities involving insignificant 
population, trade, and investment levels relative of global counterparts. 
 Second, It is very unlikely to work in a starkly uneven region, such as North 
America, for reasons of that asymmetry: Asymmetry in West Europe assumes a bottom-
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line all members have satisfied, which has not evolved over 15 years in North 
America—and unlikely elsewhere. 
 Third, other options have become more attractive in a world and era ignited by 
the communication revolution, instant globalization patterns, and an urgency for 
markets, because of the technological developments, demanding countries to go 
“beyond the regional level”. 
 Fourth, the necessary relationship with a political order must not only be worked 
out mechanically and empirically, rather than through assumptions, but also be capable 
of explaining why it permitted West European integration amid the Cold War yet failing 
to enhance North American integration amid the war on terror: What security 
considerations are helpful and un-conducive? 
 Fifth, the sufficient condition of going “beyond the state” (or nationalism) also 
needs reconsideration, since the retreat to nationalism has not been adequately severed 
as to permit regionalism: Not just a terror attack, but also escaping a recession, drawing 
the immigration limit, and most of all, blunting self-seeking opportunities at the most 
materialistic moment in human history. 
